Teams

Theresa Borge and Colt Watkiss

I. Whether Doe’s claim for injunctive relief is moot now because after the commencement of litigation, the University altered its sexual harassment policy to eliminate the general requirement of eye-witness corroboration, and because Doe has deferred enrollment and is not enrolled for the upcoming semester?

II. Whether the University can be liable for damages under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment, even if the student victim experienced just one specific incident of harassment, and the student victim did not suffer additional acts of harassment after she reported it to the University?

Last practice October 10th.

Katherine Ahn and Richard Young

1. Whether this Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos bars claims under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by public university professors related to speech undertaken as part of their official teaching duties. (Richard)

2. Whether a public university’s placement of the negative reasons for a professor’s termination in a private personnel record constitutes a deprivation of liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, where that record is potentially accessible to the public under a state open records statute. (Katherine)

Last practice October 12th.

Hanna Kim and Jae Shin

1. Whether this Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos bars claims under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by public university professors related to speech undertaken as part of their official teaching duties? (Hanna)

2. Whether a public university’s placement of the negative reasons for a professor’s termination in a private personnel record constitutes a deprivation of liberty under the Due Process clause of the 14th amendment, where that record is potentially accessible to the public under a state open records statute. (Jae)

Last practice October 13th.

Donato Cipponeri, Kassi Mettler, Hayley Slater

I. Did the Bankruptcy Court properly exercise "hypothetical jurisdiction" over the state law tort claims and determine it was not mandated to abstain from considering those claims?

II. May a child sue a fertility doctor for emotion harm arising out of an IVF procedure in which the doctor, without permission, substituted his own sperm for the sperm of the individual the child believed to be his father?

Last practice October 28th.

Genevieve Fermin, David Gay, and Yassamin Khazeni

At 12 years old, Liam Johnson (Petitioner) discovered his deceased father was not actually his genetic relative. Turns out, Liam's parents received in vitro fertilization (IVF) from Dr. Smith (Respondent), who swapped his own reproductive material for that of Liam's "father." Liam alleges that Dr. Smith committed medical malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Because the IVF clinic employing Dr. Smith has since declared chapter eleven bankruptcy, Respondent removed the case to federal district court, which subsequently transferred venue to US Bankruptcy Court.

I. Did the Bankruptcy Court properly exercise "hypothetical jurisdiction" over the state law tort claims and determine it was not mandated to abstain from considering those claims?

II. May a child sue a fertility doctor for emotional harm arising out of an IVF procedure in which the doctor without permission substituted his own sperm for the sperm of the individual the child believed to be his father?

Last practice October 30th.